

Letter
A
LETTER

TO A

Member of Parliament
In the COUNTRY,

CONCERNING THE

Present Posture of Affairs in Christendom:

First, *In Defence of the* TREATY OF PARTITION.

Secondly, *Shewing the great Prejudices that Europe in General, and England in Particular, are like to receive from the Acceptation of the late King of Spain's Will, contrary to the Obligations of the said Treaty.*

In Answer to

A LETTER from him upon that Subject.

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LETTER

TO THE

MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

IN THE

COMMONS

OF GREAT BRITAIN

AND IRELAND

IN THE

YEAR 1841

AND

THE

SEVENTH

YEAR OF

THE
PREFACE.

THE Substance of this Letter may be resolv'd, for the Reader's Ease, into the following Heads, by way of Abstract.

First, *It shews the Necessity there was for making the Treaty of Partition, and the great Advantages which would have ensu'd the Observation of it.*

Secondly, *That the Entering into this Treaty, cannot well be charg'd with having given occasion to the Will in behalf of the Duke of Anjou.*

Thirdly, *That instead of creating a Misunderstanding between us and the Emperor, 'tis rather what ought to have United us closer together, by the Considerable Advantages obtain'd in that Treaty, for the House of Austria.*

The P R E F A C E.

Fourthly, *That a due Execution of it, would have prov'd an infallible Means of insuring the Publick Peace of Europe; whereas the acceptation of the Will cannot fail of disturbing it.*

Fifthly, *That the Observation of the Treaty could never have brought any Prejudice upon our Trade, nor that of the Dutch in the Mediterranean; but on the contrary, that the Acceptation of the Will is more likely to Ruine our Trade, both there and elsewhere.*

Sixthly, *That this Acceptation ought to make us apprehensive for the Loss of Flanders; and of what Consequence such a Loss would be to England.*

Seventhly, *What Measures we ought to take in so Nice and Important a Juncture.*

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A
LETTER
TO
A Member of Parliament
IN THE
COUNTRY, &c.

S I R,

I Find by the Honour of your last Letter, that besides the News which I take care to send, you desire farther to have my Thoughts, as by advance, you have already communicated yours, about the late King of Spain's Will, and the Resolution taken at the
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the *French* Court, to accept of it, in Prejudice to the *Treaty of Partition*. I have Examined as carefully as I could, the Reasons whereby you endeavour to prove, it is more for the Advantage of *Europe* in general, and *England* in particular, that *France* should accept of the Will, as it has done, than stand to the Engagements of the *Treaty*.

I have generally had a particular Deference for your Judgment, knowing it to be back'd with a thorough Integrity; and it is with a very great Reluctancy and Unwillingness, that I must now differ from you: Protesting at the same time, that it is both out of Regard to your Person, and Concern for the Welfare of the Nation, whose Interest, as it ought, sticks very close to my Heart. I am very sorry to find, that, after having acquir'd so much Credit and Reputation as you have in the House of Commons, by your known Zeal, and upright Intentions for the True Interest of *England*, which has appear'd in most Debates, you seem now to be prepar'd, against our next publick Deliberations, with Sentiments that are not, as I conceive, altogether so suitable to it, as were to be wish'd, and you your self would have them. Whether I have any Reason or no for my Opinion, is what I refer to your own Judgment in perusing the following Sheets.

The Character you bear of an Excellent Patriot, which makes you hear Reason without running into Heats and Parties; and knowing, that you believe me to be thoroughly affected for the Publick Good, and consequently to aim at the same Ends with your self, how much soever we differ at present in our Thoughts concerning the Means, has inclin'd me to return, with so much
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the more freedom this Answer, to what you desire; being very confident, that it will be well taken, as it is well mean't.

First, *You endeavour to make out in your Letter, That instead of entering into a Treaty, which would have redounded so much to the Advantage of France, 'twas rather our Business to keep in with the Emperor, and take such Measures jointly with him, as might tend to the procuring the Archduke the Succession of Spain.*

1. The Necessity there was for making the Treaty of Partition, and the great Advantages which would have ensued the Observation of it.

Thus far I must agree with you in this Point, That it would be much better for us to have that Prince Monarch of *Spain*, than the Duke of *Anjou*; and that he would have kept the Affairs of *Europe* in a better counterpoise for the preserving its publick Peace and Tranquility. But you must grant at the same time, that this Prince could not be seated on that Throne but by one of these Two Ways; either by engaging into a Confederate War against *France*, and aiming at the whole, or entering into such a *Treaty of Partition* as might peaceably accommodate both Parties.

As for the first Case, the Undertaking would have been too hazardous, and the Event doubtful. Every Body knows very well, that whenever the King of *Spain* should come to dye, still it would be much sooner than the several Powers concern'd in the forming a Confederacy for the Archdukes Succession, could be in a readiness to act; and that *France*, having all its Forces at hand, united under one Chief and Interest, and without a variety of Dominions to march through, would have been beforehand in a Condition, not only to make very considerable

able Progresses in *Flanders*, but to march directly to *Madrid* it self, and assert there the Pretensions of its Princes. The *Spaniards* finding themselves altogether unable to make Head against such sudden Irruptions, would have been forc'd, by a ready Submission, to prevent the utter Ruine and Desolation of their Country. Their present Conduct does but too evidently shew what they would have done in that Juncture. Now, Sir, I leave it to your own Judgment, whether in such a Situation of Affairs; we could with any Reason have propos'd to our selves, after a long and tedious War, at least as general and Expensive as that terminated by the Treaty of *Ryswick*, the reducing of a Prince of *France* to quit the Throne of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and resign it to the Archduke, together with the *Low-Countries*; and the *French* King to content himself with the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*; the *Dutchy* of *Lorraine* in Exchange for *Milan*, and the other Advantages stipulated by the Treaty? Would not such a Success be look'd upon as the greatest Exploit compass'd by a Confederacy that has ever been, and as something incredible, and beyond our own Expectation?

One thing is certain, that in order to have such Hopes as these grounded upon a Humane Probability, it was absolutely necessary *England* should make as great Efforts, and engage it self in as Expensive a War at least, as that it has lately been freed from. But I dare expect the Concurrence of your Opinion in this, That it was not fit to expose the Nation to so Burdensome an Inconveniency again, but at the last Extremity, and upon the failing of all other Expedients. You know very well, that *England* depending upon a Peace that has cost it so
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much Blood and Treasure, has turn'd its Thoughts upon making the best advantages of it; and for that reason has thought it more adviseable to disband its Forces, than do any thing that look'd like Preparations for a fresh War, however near the occasion seem'd to be to plunge us into it anew, together with the rest of Christendom. The languishing Condition the late King of *Spain* lay in, gave us good Grounds to fear all this might happen in a short time. Tell me then, whether it would have been prudent to tarry for such an Event, to involve us into new Troubles, without any Endeavours beforehand to reconcile if possible so near and threatening an Emergency with our present Tranquillity? Could any thing have been thought of more conformable (the case being so) to the Interest both of *England* and *Holland*, to that of the Emperor himself, and to the general Good of *Christendom*, than that very Treaty you endeavour to condemn?

You insist, *That this Treaty would have procured too great Advantages to the French, if it had taken effect.* But can you in your conscience think that they would have been less Gainers by a War, than what the Treaty allow'd? Or can you believe that *France* would ever have consented to a Treaty for the yeilding up of the whole; and receding from all those Advantages it had reason to expect from the readiness it is in to act so much before-hand with any Confederates, and an almost certain Assurance of a general Submission among the *Spaniards*, to avoid their being over-run and ruin'd of a sudden by the quick Torrent of its Arms? Farther, it was no small Point gain'd, to have brought *France* in it to a Renunciation of all its Pretentions

upon the Kingdom of *Navarre*, which some time or other might have given occasion to new Ruptures. And not only so; but the main of the Business was to secure *Spain* and the *Indies*, together with the *Low-Countries*, to the Arch-Duke, that is, to a Prince whom that piece of Service must have ever united to our Interest; to spare the Nation the Expence of a dangerous and burdensome War; and to secure to it that which at once makes our Prosperity and Glory, the unvaluable Prerogative of holding the Ballance of *Europe* in our hands. Were not then such great Advantages as these worthy to be purchased at the Price of some small Sacrifice?

2. The Entering into the *Treaty* cannot be charg'd with having given occasion to the making of the Will.

You pretend, as a farther Exception, *That the late King of Spain would never have been prevail'd with to nominate the Duke of Anjou for his universal Heir, had it not been for the Treaty, thereby to keep the Monarchy entire, contrary to the Designs and purposes of it; so that we must look upon the one as having given occasion to the other.* Think rather, That the Apprehensions we had of such a Will, in favour of *France*, was a principal Motive for our entering into that *Treaty*; and then I dare say your Sentiments will come much nearer to the Truth. Our Court had very good Intelligence, when the *Treaty* was set on foot, that the Emperor's Party dwindled, and that the Marquis de *Harcourt* improv'd his Master's Interest, daily more and more at the Court of *Spain*. We had good Advice, that those persons who had the greatest Ascendent over the King, and who were likely to have the greatest Influence in the Management of his last Dispo-

Disposition, were altogether inclin'd for one of the Dauphin's Sons. The Ministers of *France*, both at home and abroad, made no Secret of the matter, but rather affected to publish it; and what they said about it, we had confirm'd from less suspected hands. So that the Design of *England* and *Holland* was in truth to prevent the Effects of such a Will, by mediating a *Treaty of Partition*, in which there was consequently an apparent necessity of giving up some parts to save the loss of the whole: 'Twas to provide against all Pretences from such a Will, that *France* has been induced to those positive and express Renunciations which are to be seen in it; and unless they would make but a meer Sham of it there, or at most that it binds *England* and *Holland* only, without inferring any Obligation upon *France*, it must be own'd that the Will, as it now stands, is the very Case in which that Crown has directly oblig'd it self to a punctual Observation of the *Treaty*, if it had been in a humour of keeping to the Terms and Purposes of it.

Well, but suppose that the *Treaty of Partition* had never had a being, do you think that the King and Grandees of *Spain* could ever have had Faith enough to believe the Arch-duke might have been instituted Heir to, and put in Possession of the whole Monarchy, without dismembring any part of it? They could not but be very sensible beforehand that *France* would certainly use its utmost Efforts to obstruct that Prince's coming to the Throne; and that after a long and cruel War, carried on in their own Countreys, it would have been impossible even at best to have hinder'd that Crown from keeping some parts in its Possession. Besides, in order to

the carrying on so vast a Design they must have been fully assured of *England*: But did they see the Nation in a Temper of engaging vigorously into a new War, upon this single Motive of the Arch-duke's having two or three Provinces more or less? Or could they imagine that the Arch-duke should ever be able to force *France* to an entire Resignation, without the greatest Efforts from *England* that ever have been made in it? They could not but foresee that the Nomination of the Arch-duke must of necessity kindle an universal War, and a War in which *Spain* must have been expos'd as a Prey to the French, whilst at the same time it would have been out of the Power of any of their Allies to afford them timely Succours. Such apparent and inevitable Dangers as these, must of themselves have determin'd the King and Grandees of *Spain* in the Duke of *Anjou's* Favour, though the *Treaty of Partition* had never had a being. His late Majesty and his Ministers, as it has evidently appeared, were resolv'd to institute such a Successor as might peaceably be seated on the Throne: And, could it have been upon a less powerful Motive than this, that a King, who all his life time has entertained so strict a Correspondence with the Emperor, that has so often been engaged in Confederacies with him for the carrying on War against *France*; that has all along appear'd so zealous for the House of *Austria*, of which he was the elder Branch; would have been prevail'd upon to cut it off from his Succession, and transfer all his vast Dominions over to a strange, not to say an hostile Family? Perhaps you will answer, That the *Treaty of Partition* had so exasperated his Catholick Majesty, as to put him upon the Course he

he has taken. But on the contrary, was it not rather a fresh and very engaging Motive to favour the Archduke in the point of his Succession, since the Emperor has stuck out of the *Treaty* for no other Reason but that it was highly displeasing to the King of Spain? Did it not rather afford a new Reason to exclude *France*, that had been the great Promoter of so disagreeable a piece of work? Let us conclude then, That the late King of Spain's Will must be look'd upon as the Production of a fearful Prudence, that has not given him leave to follow the Motions and Dictates of his own Heart.

You urge, *That the Treaty of Partition tended to the creating a Misunderstanding between us and the Emperor.* But I think, for my part, we had reason to expect the clear contrary Effect from it: If the Emperor's Court would have known; or had been willing to follow its true Interest, nothing could have provided more effectually than the *Treaty*, for the establishing a most strict and inviolable Union between us. Nothing has been transacted, during the whole Negotiation, but what has been communicated to that Court; and all possible means have been used to obtain its approbation before the Conclusion of it: Finding all these steps to fail of Success, the Emperor has had three Months time given him by the *Treaty*, to consider deliberately of it; and moreover, to provide against his peremptory Refusal to come in after the expiration of the said Term, and his receiving any Prejudices by it, *France* has been perswaded to enter into

3. Instead of creating a Misunderstanding between us and the Emperor, the *Treaty* of *Paris* ought rather to have united us closer together.

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a secret Article (which every one knows at present) whereby it was stipulated, That the Emperor's Acceptation might still be receiv'd to the term of two Months after his Catholick Majesty's Decease.

The Emperor ought undoubtedly to have declared himself within the first term, upon many weighty Considerations; and not tarry'd for the King of *Spain's* Death, to signify his Consent. He was often forewarn'd to take care, lest a Will in behalf of the Duke of *Anjou* (which was but too probable) should one day foreclose the Arch-duke from the whole Succession, if the Imperial Court did not betimes take proper Measures with *England* and *Holland* to oblige *France* in such a Case to a punctual Execution of the *Treaty*: We often represented, That what was allow'd to the Arch-duke in it, was too considerable, to neglect the fair Opportunity that offer'd it self to insure it, without running the Risk of a doubtful War: That his Acceptation of the *Treaty* would bring in all the Princes of the Empire, the *Swisse Cantons*, and both the Northern Crowns, to be *Guarantees* of it: Which Security, being at once required by the Emperor, *England*, *Holland*, and *France* it self, could not have been denied. He had it suggested to him, That the unanimous Consent of all *Europe* was the only Expedient that could preserve Peace at such a time, since it would have made so strong a *Guaranty* for the Execution of the *Treaty*, that *France* durst not have ventur'd to break through it. If the Imperial Court would hearken to none of these important Suggestions; if, by persisting in a stiff Refusal, it has encourag'd *France*, and even furnish'd it with a Pretence to recede from those

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Engagements it had enter'd into with us, and confer upon the Duke of *Anjou's* Head a Crown it had so lately renounc'd to in so Solemn and Express a Manner; This is so far from giving a just Occasion to blame the *Treaty*, that nothing can better prove how advantageous it would have been to all *Europe*, than the readiness of the *French* to violate it.

You proceed, and say, *That France will not fail to alledge in its Defence, that as Affairs are at present, and considering the Emperor's having persisted in his refusal so long, it tends more to the Preservation of the Publick Peace of Christendom, for France to accept of the Will, than stand to the Treaty of Partition; because if the Will were refused, and the Dukes of Anjou and Berry denied the Benefit of it, the Spaniards would certainly call in the Arch-duke to take upon him the whole Succession, and so keep up to the Purposes of the Will, which gives him the next Substitution to those Two Princes; And that the Emperor being bound in such a Case to stand by the Will, and endeavour to keep the Monarchy entire, there would be an evident necessity of entering into a War with him and his Allies and the whole Monarchy of Spain submitting unanimously to the Arch-duke, in which we must have several entire Kingdoms to Conquer, in order to bring Matters within the Terms of the Treaty.*

Sir, Give me Leave to tell you, that you have but a very indifferent Opinion of the Capacities of the *French* Court, to think its Ministers can pay the World with such poor Reasons: When they want good Reasons for what they do, they at least know better

4. The Observation of the *Treaty* would have prov'd an effectual Means of preserving the Publick Peace of *Europe*, but the Acceptation of the Will cannot fail of disturbing it.

better how to carry it off with Plausible Colours. What you make them say for themselves, runs upon a Principle absolutely false, which consists in supposing, that even in the present situation of Affairs, the Emperor would still persist in his refusal, were the Matter left to his Choice: But such an absurdity as this cannot well be thought of. 'Tis true, that the Imperial Court, feeding it self with vain Hopes, that the King of *Spain's* Will would run altogether on the Arch-duke's side; or, at the worst, imagining that it would still have time to accept of the *Treaty*, in pursuance of the Secret Article, Two Months after the King of *Spain's* Death should happen, has upon this double View neglected to consent to what we demanded. But must we from thence conclude, that they would have still persisted in the same Disposition at *Vienna*, when undeceived by the Event, they find a Will, wherein not the Arch-duke, but the Duke of *Anjou* is nominated to the whole Succession, and that the *Spaniards* have received the Will with so general an Applause and Satisfaction? Is it not certain, that if in this Case *France* would still agree to the Execution of the *Treaty*, the Emperor would think himself very happy in having his Son Peaceable Sovereign of *Spain*, the *Indies*, and *Flanders*? and if so, then this grand Affair, contrary to your Argument, would certainly be made up without the least drop of Blood spilt about it.

France at least, to cover its falling off from the *Treaty* with a Plausible Pretence, and to ground this Argument upon Matter of Fact, ought according to the Engagements of the Secret Article, to have still left

left the Emperor his Choice, either of accepting or refusing the Conditions of the *Treaty*; and the Emperor still resolving to stick out, then *France* would have had Reason indeed, to object the Wars which must ensue, if it had stood to the *Treaty of Partition* in prejudice of the Will; in order to force the Emperor to content himself with the Conditions of it. But this is a Risk that *France* has not thought fit to run, knowing very well, that, as Affairs are at present, there was no Reason at all to Question the Emperor's Approbation. If the *French* Court could with any Reason have reckon'd upon a peremptory Refusal at *Vienna*, would it not have been a very proper Course to have offer'd the Emperor his Choice, thus to have laid the whole Fault at his Door, and remain blameless? But if it has not done this upon very good Presumptions that the Imperial Court would certainly come in, how then can the Ministers of *France* alledge with any pretence, to justify their Acceptation of the Will, that their standing to the *Treaty* would but occasion a War to force the House of *Austria* and its Allies, to acquiesce in the Conditions of it? To say, That although the Emperor had accepted of it, yet still we must have had the *Spanish* Nation to subdue, who in such a Case would have used their utmost Efforts to prevent the Dismembring of their Monarchy; and consequently, that notwithstanding the Emperor's Acceptation, yet still a War could not be avoided, is altogether inconsistent even with Common Sense, which without the least improvement in Politicks, must of it self convince us, that the *Spanish* Nation could never have been able to bring the least Obstacle, or, even the

least Delay, to the Execution of a *Treaty* which the Emperor and the Empire, *England* and *Holland*, and *France* it self, would then have unanimously agreed to.

This Reasoning, which you impute to the *French* Court, does farther include another very absurd Contradiction. For, to make it hold Water, they must suppose in *France*, that were they to allow the *Treaty* still to subsist, the Emperor, not satisfied with the great number of Kingdoms and Provinces which would come to the Arch-duke's Share by it, would farther aim by force of Arms at the whole Monarchy, and in order thereto would boldly ingage into a War against *England*, *France*, and *Holland*, united: And at the same time to make their Pretence good for Preferring the Will to the *Treaty*, that it tends more to the Preservation of the Publick Peace; they must suppose, that the Emperor, who now sees his Son deprived of the whole Succession, will nevertheless bear it patiently; notwithstanding the Hopes he may pretend to of having *England* and *Holland*, together with *Portugal*, of his side, by the great Interest they have in the Preservation of the *Treaty* which is now violated; whereas in the other Case they would have been against him.

5. The Execution of the *Treaty* could have brought no Prejudice to our Trade, nor that of the *Dutch* in the *Mediterranean*, but on the contrary, the Acceptation of the Will may ruin our Trade both there and elsewhere.

I come now to Consider your main Argument against the *Treaty* of Partition, which you set forth in exaggerating the Condition that *France* would have been in, by it, to Command absolutely the Commerce of the *Mediterranean*; which must have brought inevitable ruine upon the Trade of

of England and Holland: from whence you infer, that the late King of Spain's Will is more for our Advantage than the Treaty. I cannot forbear telling of you, that I find a Partiality in your Argument, I could not think you capable of: For, if you are really persuaded, that France having once possession of the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, would be in a Condition to ruine our Trade in the Mediterranean, without being obliged to have any regard to the Alliance grounded upon that very Treaty, which then would have had its due Effect; can you imagine it will be more complaisant to us now, that it has broke through all the Obligations of it; without making the least use of those Advantages which the Duke of Anjou's Accession to the Throne of Spain seems to offer? Why must you fancy, that France would have gone back from its Engagements in the first Case, when it could have only pretended to interrupt our Levant Trade; and in the second, that it will be more exact and scrupulous, notwithstanding the Condition it is in of aspiring at the Command not only of the Levant Trade, but likewise of the Indies; when it has so fair an Opportunity of attempting at a Monopoly of the Spanish Wooll, to the perfecting of its Manufactures, and the ruine of our own; when it has both Power and Pretence for making such Enterprizes upon the Spanish-Netherlands, as must draw the ruine of Holland after them, which then must be soon follow'd by that of England too? You will own, I dare say, That if England and Holland appear altogether insensible in so nice a Juncture, without shewing the least inclination to bestir themselves, it will be much more easie for the French to compass all these

great Designs, than to have ruin'd our Trade in the *Mediterranean*, if the *Treaty of Partition* had been full'd: Because, there would still have remain'd such a Counterpoise and Ballance of Affairs in *Europe*, in this last Case, as should have bound *France* to a Peaceable Behaviour, and kept it from any Infractions or Innovations: The Pope, and all the Princes of *Italy*, who must have been very Jealous of so Powerful Neighbours, would have been ready to take hold of the first favourable Opportunity of making a League against them, in which the Emperor would have been very willing to come in, both for his Interest and that of the Duke of *Lorrain*, his Nephew, who then would have been Duke of *Milan*: The Arch-duke, then King of *Spain*, would have struck close to us, and concurr'd in all those Measures which we our selves should have thought necessary for the safety of *Flanders*, the common Barriere both to *England* and *Holland* against *France*.

And now, Sir, I leave you to Judge, whether *France* durst have ventur'd upon the interrupting of the *English* and *Dutch* Trade in the *Mediterranean*, when in the very Attempt, the *French* must have brought those Two Powerful Nations, the Emperor and Empire, the King of *Spain*, and all the Princes of *Italy*, upon their back? You would fain remove our Fears and Jealousies by the present Disposition they have in *France* of living peaceably with their Neighbours. But who can secure you, that this Crown does not feed its Ambition with Hopes of succeeding in all those Projects which the favourable Juncture of the Duke of *Anjou's* Elevation to the Throne of *Spain* may put it upon? This one thing, at least, seems to me very
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expedient, that we must not in common Prudence give the *French* any encouragement to enter into Temptation ; by making them sensible before-hand of meeting with Difficulties enow to make them miscarry in the Execution. Should we not render our selves altogether inexcusable, if our present Indolence should become their principal Motive for venturing upon any, though never so bold and prejudicial Undertakings ? that being to be depended upon, they can have no Reason at all to apprehend the Event. No sooner has *France* found, that it could place the Duke of *Anjou* upon the *Spanish* Throne, but all the Engagements it lay under to us by the *Treaty of Partition*, have not had force enough to bind it : And can we think, after such an Example as this, that it will make a Difficulty of attempting any thing for its Advantage, in which there may be a probability of Success ?

I fell t'other day in Company with a Gentleman, who I believe had not as charitable Thoughts of the Disposition they are in in *France*, as you. Do not think, said he, directing his Discourse to me, That *France* will stop short in so fair a way of forming great Designs ; nor that it has renounc'd to so many fine Provinces which by the *Treaty of Partition* would have been settled upon it ; if it did not expect some more considerable Advantages in accepting of the Will. That Court is too well known for being acted wholly by its Interest, for the rest of the World to believe it has broke through all the Obligations of a Treaty, so lately and so solemnly made, upon the single Motive of aggrandizing the Duke of *Anjou*. Sir, you may assure your self it has had advantageous ends of its own in the doing of it. *France* does certainly expect to Govern under the name of

of the new King, and the Grandfather to have all the Influence he can desire in his Councils. The Recompence lately bestow'd on the Marquis de Harcourt, in dignifying him with the Title of a Duke, does but too evidently bespeak the nature of the Services he has render'd during his Embassy at Madrid; and the Choice that is now made of him, to return thither in the same quality, plainly discovers what Services are expected from him there for the future: It is, no doubt, to continue his Intrigues in a Court he is thoroughly acquainted with. Those among the Grandees whom he has found ways of bringing over to put the late King upon so favourable a Testament to France, and who only are employ'd in the present Ministry, will be very apt to second him in all his Projects. They will make it their business to persuade their new Master, who will be ready enough to receive such Impressions, That by closing in with France there will be nothing impossible for him; and that he need not doubt of putting himself one day in a condition of re-uniting those flourishing States to his Monarchy which have been not long since dismembred from it. In a Word, not only England and Holland ought to apprehend the loss of their Trade, but all Europe ought to dread the loss of its Liberty.

This Gentleman was very far from looking upon the Acceptation of the late King of Spain's Will as more for our Advantage than the Treaty. Perhaps you will answer, That his Fears and Apprehensions were groundless; But has not the French Court it self in effect insinuated the contrary? since in the first Article it declares, as a principal Motive for making the Treaty of Partition it has enter'd into joyntly with His Majesty and the States-General, That it has been with a design to remove all those Umbrages which so many vast Territories,
united

united under one Head, must otherwise give. They indeed speak at present in *France* after another manner; and finding that in stead of the Arch-duke, the Duke of *Anjou* himself has been nominated, they conceive no more Jealousies and Fears from the Uniting of all these Dominions in one single Power. But I dare say, you will find such a Turn as this too partial not to suspect it.

I may therefore expect your concurrence with me in this point, that in the present Posture of Affairs, *England* and *Holland* cannot stand too much upon their Guard. We all know how often *France* has endeavour'd to have the *Spanish Netherlands* in its Possession, and make a Conquest which would have brought so considerable an addition to its Power. I may farther say, That we all see these Countreys at present (unless we are resolv'd to shut our eyes) in greater danger than ever of falling under the Dominion of *France*. They are not like to want there, either Pretences for the sending Forces upon them, or Means of bringing the *Spaniards* over to consent to it: And frequent Suggestions will be given them of Enemies ready to seize upon these rich Provinces, and wrest them at once from their Monarchy and the Catholick Religion. The most Chr——n K——'s readiness to take his Grandson's Dominions under his Protection, will step in next, and be set out in its most plausible Colours and Advantages: And who knows but the old Project may again be set on foot of having these Countreys yealded up to *France* for an Equivalent?

6. The Acceptation of the Will ought to make us fear for the loss of *Holland*, and of what consequence such a loss would be to *England*.

I do not doubt but you comprehend very well how fatal the Consequences of such an Event must be to us. Not only the adjoining Countreys of *Liege*, *Juliers*, *Treves* and *Cologne*, could not then avoid coming under the Yoke of *France*; but what deserves our Care and Attention most, *Holland* it self, whose Fleets and Armies have had so considerable a share among the Allies for the common Safety, being expos'd on all sides to the formidable Power of *France*, would run an evident Risk either of being downright subdued by, or at least brought in a state of Vassalage to, it.

The *French* being once Masters of *Flanders*, have no more to do for the giving a deadly Blow to this Republick, but bring back Trade to *Antwerp* by forcing a free Navigation on the *Scheld*; which would leave the *Dutch* no other way of sending off such a Stroke, but by putting themselves so under the Protection of *France*, as to be barr'd from entring into any Leagues without having first the Approbation of that Court; and from the enjoyment of their flourishing Trade, but upon condition that *France* should share in the Profits of it, and that they in Conjunction with that Crown should endeavour to destroy ours. If *France*, having no other Sea-port besides *Dunkirk* in the *Low Countreys*, has found out the way of drawing so considerable Advantages from, and making it turn so much to the Prejudice of our Navigation? what must we expect, when being possess'd of the remaining Sea-ports of *Flanders*, it will have those of *Zealand* and *Holland* so at command, as to dispose of them with the same Authority as if they actually belonged to that Crown? Do you in your Conscience believe we should then be able to make head

Head against it? and that its Riches being so vastly encreas'd with the number of its Subjects, and its Union with *Spain* putting it in a fair way of having the main Ascendent over, or rather Command of Trade, from the *Bulrick* to the *Levant* and the *Indies*, we could find a competent Rampart in our Fleet, which then would be our only remaining one, to withstand a Power so formidable both by Land and Sea?

We have some People in *England* extravagant enough to saillie, That with a good Fleet we need not fear tho' all the World were against us; which Opinion of theirs runs 'em into this most dangerous Maxim, *That we need not concern our selves at all with the state of things abroad, even among our nearest Neighbours.* But after the Experience of the late War, one would think it were needless to confute so groundless an Error: We do not meet with it now, but in the Mouths of some false-hearted Protestants for some by Ends which are known to every Body; or of open and profess'd Papists, who would gladly see the Protestant Religion and Interest quite oppress'd among our Neighbours, as well as their Laws and Liberties, in hopes thereby of seeing the same thing effected in *England* soon after; the one being an apparent Consequence of the other. 'Tis what the Representatives of the Nation were very sensible of in the late War, and therefore what put them upon making those Efforts, as shew'd they had no less Penetration in Judging of our Danger, than Zeal and Readiness to prevent it. They were fully convinc'd, that the Interest as well as Glory of *England* consists in keeping the Ballance of *Europe* in our Hands, which infers an indispensable necessity of con-

cerning our selves with what happens in it. They were sensible the Nation could not carry its Trade in too many Places, and that in order thereunto we must make a great many Alliances, which consequently it must be our true Interest vigorously to maintain, and faithfully to observe. If they thought it their Duty on the one Hand to help and assist their Allies, on the other they were far from despising those Succours which might be had from them. They readily admitted the Junction of the *Dutch Fleet* to ours, being well satisfied it added very much to our Strength and Power. In a Word, their whole Conduct made it plainly appear, they were thoroughly persuaded, *That, as Europe could not then be rescued from Slavery, but by the effectual Succours of England, so neither can England, escape if the rest of Europe be enslav'd.*

And yet this is an Extremity we should soon find our selves reduc'd to, if *France* being possess'd of *Flanders*, should once disable the *Dutch* from being in a Condition to assist us, or which is yet worse, force them to a necessity of joining against us in their own Defence, to bring that present Ruine upon others, which otherwise would fall upon them. All manner of Communication being then cut off between us and *Germany*, they finding in the Empire no possibility of receiving any help from *England*, would neither have the Will nor the Power of making the least Diversion in our favour. And to compleat our Disasters, What Condition should we be in, if our Fleet, which then would be our only, though weak Refuge, were either shatter'd in a Storm, or defeated in Battle? *Sir*, I appeal to your own Judgment, if after the ruine of our Trade,

Trade, we could be able to sustain a War with an already formidable Crown, after such vast accessions to its Strength both by Sea and Land? Let our Merchants judge, whether we could carry on our Trade, if the Seaports of *Holland*, and those of *Spain* both in the Old and New World, were shut against us? When *France* commanding the Treasures both of *Peru* and *Mexico*, would make quite another use of them, than what *Spain* has done? In short, when our Merchant Ships, Islands and Plantations, would lie at the discretion of those vast Fleets, both of Men of War and Privateers, which this Power would then cover, the Seas with?

Were it necessary to enter farther into Particulars, for the making out this too palpable Truth, I could easily demonstrate, that as Affairs would then stand, we might be denied the Liberty of the *Baltick* as well as *Mediterranean* Seas; and of Trading our selves into *Spain*, *Italy*, the *Levant*, and the *Indies*; that *Portugal* would not dare receive our Ships into its Harbours, or, which is yet more to be feared, would be in danger of being re-united, as it has lately been, to the Crown of *Spain*; That the ruine of our Manufactures would quickly follow that of our Navigation; But this appears too plain for me to insist upon it.

May be you are ready to answer, *That these things cannot come to pass without supposing an Union of Spain to France, which is not likely to happen; and that it is to be hop'd the new King will soon become a very good Spaniard.* But is it not rather more likely, that this Prince will in the main follow the Humour and Directions of *France* in the Management of his Affairs; and that the Duke of *Harcourt* will be in the Secret,

and at the bottom of all his Counsels? I may add, That a false Zeal for Religion, whose Maxims *France* does blindly follow, and which prevails no less in *Spain*, will be a very Powerful Motive to unite these Two Crowns together in the same Measures and Interests, and set them upon the ruine of those that pass among them for Hereticks; especially when that puts them upon a prospect of carrying on the whole Trade of *Europe* between them. Farther, it is more than probable, that the Grandees of *Spain*, having so openly declared themselves against the Emperor's Pretensions, and who for that Reason cannot be well look'd upon at the Court of *Vienna*, will throw themselves altogether into the *French* Interest. I ask then, if while we are threaten'd with so great and apparent Dangers, we must quietly expect our Destiny, without making use of those Remedies we have still in reserve to provide against them?

7. What Measures we ought to take in so nice and important a Juncture.

There is no other way for us to avert these Mischiefs, but by putting our selves (together with *Holland*) in a good Posture of Defence: That of it self will still have some Awe upon *France*, and oblige it to keep Measures with us; otherwise we may expect such Infractions and Innovations as must involve us at last into an unhappy War; and the best way to avoid it, is to shew we are dispos'd upon Occasion to carry it on with the utmost vigour. If any thing is capable of opening the *Spaniards* Eyes, and making them listen to their true Interest, which is to keep in the same Terms with *England* and *Holland* as in the late Reigns, it must be by making them sensible

sensible we have still both the Will and the Power to Look to our Selves, and Stand effectually by our Allies: Without this, they must close in with France, and leave us the displeasure of having oblig'd them to it. If our Preparations prevent a War, can we desire a happier Effect from them? But if they cannot prevent our being Attack'd, do they not then become absolutely necessary for our Defence?

As Circumstances are at present, that our Trade runs no small Risk, I hope you will allow that we are under an indispensable Obligation of having a good Fleet at Sea; and that it is no less necessary to keep up the publick Credit of the Nation, in making good an deficient Funds: But, that which ought chiefly to be the Care of the Nation; we must give all possible Demonstrations of an entire Confidence in the KING, and let the World know, in as publick and authentick a manner as we can, That we shall always be ready to concur with and second His Majesty to the utmost of our Power in such Engagements as He shall think necessary to enter into abroad; for the Safety and Welfare of his People.

How great soever our Dangers may seem, yet we have this for our present Comfort, That we shall not want Power to help our selves, whil't we have that RENOWN'D PRINCE, who so Gloriously fills the Throne, at the Helm of Affairs. It is impossible even to think upon those Misfortunes in which the present Juncture of Affairs would inevitably involve Europe in general; and England in particular; without trembling, were we now wanting the unvaluable Benefit of His Prudent Administration! Nothing less than a Prince

a Prince who has so much Credit and Interest in all the Courts of *Germany*, who bears so great a Sway in *Holland*, and upon that account is so fit to Cement that Union between us and this Commonwealth, which is now more than ever necessary, can effectually provide for the common Safety: And since the past Experience of his Reign tells us, That God has granted and preserv'd this Prince to us for our Deliverance in many pressing Dangers and Difficulties, let us make the best Advantage we can of that Time which God has still in store for him! Let us shew to all *Christendom*, by our Zeal and Cheerfulness in standing by so worthy a CHIEF, That we are not a Nation whose Alliance is to be neglected, and Enmity despis'd. I am,

London Dec. 1.

1700.

F I N I S.

